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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Javier Aguilar appeals from his Judgment and Commitment stemming from a jury
verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. In
his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Aguilar has asserted that the district court erred in allowing the
jury to hear irrelevant testimony, from a purported expert, regarding the long-term
impact that sexual abuse can have on victims, over the objection of his counsel. He
further asserted that the State will be unable to show that the district court's error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, Mr. Aguilar asserted that the

district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive total unified sentence of
life, with twenty-one years fixed, in light of the mitigating evidence that exists in this
case.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the district
court did not err in allowing the expert to opine on the long-term impacts of sexual
abuse, arguing that the information was relevant to Mr. Aguilar's credibility. As will be
demonstrated below, the State's argument is without merit.

The State's alternative

argument that the error is harmless and its argument that the district court did not abuse
its sentencing discretion are unremarkable and will not be addressed in this Reply Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Aguilar's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to present expert testimony about
the negative long-term effects of sexual abuse, over the objection of defense
counsel, as such testimony was not relevant for the jury's consideration?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in
light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Expert Testimony About The
Negative Long-Term Effects Of Sexual Abuse, Over The Objection Of Defense
Counsel, As Such Testimony Was Not Relevant For The Jury'S Consideration
The jury was asked to determine whether Javier Aguilar committed the crimes of
lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen, allegedly perpetrated against three
young boys, years before the trial took place. Over the objection of defense counsel,
the State was allowed to present testimony from its expert witness about the long-term
effects of sexual abuse. Mr. Aguilar asserts that the district court erred in allowing this
testimony to be presented as it was irrelevant as to whether or not Mr. Aguilar
committed the alleged crimes; thus, the testimony was inadmissible under Idaho Rules
of Evidence 401 and 402. Furthermore, Mr. Aguilar asserts that the State will be unable
to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In response, the State argues "Ms. Yeager's [the expert in question] testimony
about the long-term effects of sexual abuse was pertinent to the victims' credibility,
which is always relevant." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) In support of this proposition, the
State cites to State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 503 (1999), which in turn quotes State v.
Arledge, 119 Idaho 548,588 (Ct. App. 1991). A closer review of these cases, however,

reveals that the State's argument is without merit.
In Hairston, a defendant charged with two counts of murder and one count of
robbery, argued that the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence on
rebuttal that he had shot a convenience store clerk in Colorado, two days before the

victims in his case were murdered. Hairston at 501. Prior to trial, the district court ruled

3

that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact;
however, after the defendant testified and presented himself as a follower who was
shocked when he saw his co-defendant shoot the victims, the court allowed the
evidence to be entered as '''impeachment and prior bad acts.'"

Id. at 501-502. The

Idaho Supreme Court held as follows:
It appears that Hairston himself opened the door for the admission of the
Colorado evidence. Hairston admitted that he was at the Fuhrimans'
house on January 6 when they were shot. He testified, however, that
Klipfel was the one who shot them. The defense in this case was
premised upon Hairston as the follower, who was shocked when Klipfel
shot the Fuhrimans and only remained with Klipfel after the murders
because he was scared. Once Hairston testified that he had not fired the
gun prior to January 6th, that he had never seen anyone shot before, and
that he had never pointed a gun at anyone, the Colorado evidence
became relevant to impeach his credibility.
Id. at 502-503. As the State correctly notes, the Hairston Court quoted the Idaho Court

of Appeals' holding in State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588 (Ct. App. 1991), stating
'''whenever evidence is introduced for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily involves
a witness' credibility, and credibility is always relevant.'" Id. at 503.
In Arledge, the defendant charged with multiple crimes occurring at his fiance's
house, a defense witness testified that the defendant had been staying at the house for
"about two days." Arledge at 586-587. The district court allowed the state to present a
written statement made by the same witness on the day of the incident, that the
defendant '''had gotten out of jail yesterday.'" Id. at 587. In affirming the district court,
the Court of Appeals held that, although not specifically included in the language of
I.R.E. 404(b), that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, may be admissible for

impeachment purposes.

Id. at 587-588.

In analyzing whether the statement was

relevant, the Court of Appeals made the statement, "whenever evidence is introduced
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for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily involves a witness' credibility, and credibility
is always relevant," cited by both the Hairston Court and the State in its Respondent's
Brief. Id. (See also Hairston at 503; Respondent's Brief, p.6.)

Hairston and Arledge stand for the unexceptional proposition that impeachment
evidence, evidence that rebuts testimony provided by a witness, is relevant.

These

cases do not stand for the proposition apparently espoused by the State that if evidence

could potentially be relevant to credibility, it will always be admissible. In the present
case, Ms. Yeager's testimony was not admitted to impeach any testimony provided by
any witness nor could it, as Ms. Yeager was the first witness to testify.

The State's

reliance on Hairston and Arledge is misplaced. 1
Furthermore, the State cites to State v. Duft, 139 Idaho 99 (Ct. App. 2003), in
which the Idaho Court of Appeals "discussed the proper scope of Ms. Yeager's
testimony, and approved her testimony about 'general behavioral and emotional
characteristics of victims and offenders in child sexual abuse.' Such testimony is proper
because it assists the jury in 'evaluating the victim's credibility.'"
p.7 (citing Duft at 105.))

(Respondent's Brief,

The State further asserts that Mr. Aguilar "has offered no

reasoned basis for concluding Ms. Yeager's testimony regarding the long-term effects of

1 The State further cites as persuasive authority State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786 (Ct. App.
2012) in which the Court of Appeals discussed "the admissibility of prior felony
convictions, which requires the court to consider 'whether the fact or nature of the
conviction is relevant to the credibility of the witness.'" (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The
Grist opinion, however, is irrelevant to the present case as Grist dealt specifically with
the application of I.R.E. 609 which is in and of itself is a rule describing the
circumstances upon which a prior felony conviction will be admissible specifically to
attack the credibility of a witness.
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sexual abuse is not relevant for this same purpose." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The
State's reliance upon Dutt is misplaced.
In Dutt, over defense objection,
Yeager testified at trial in general terms concerning the progression of
sexual abuse through various phases. Yeager also testified in general
terms about the behavior and characteristics of victims and offenders as
the sexual abuse progresses through each phase, including the victims'
tendency to delay disclosing the abuse and the possible reasons for
the delay.
Dutf at 104 (emphasis added).

In upholding the district court's decision to allow

Ms. Yeager's testimony, the Court of Appeals did not hold that anything Ms. Yeager
testified to would necessarily be admissible; rather, the Court held,
The issue of whether the victim's conduct in disclosing the details of
her sexual abuse in the present case was consistent with the behavior of
other sexually abused children was a matter beyond the common
experience of the jury and was, therefore, a proper subject of testimony by
a qualified expert. Yeager's generalized testimony gave the jurors
specialized knowledge that could assist them in evaluating the victim's
credibility.
Id. (citing State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 811-812 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis

added). Thus, while the Court of Appeals recognized that Ms. Yeager's testimony in
that case was relevant to credibility, the Court's focus was specific to the issue of how
the discloser occurred in that case, an issue of credibility in and of itself. The Court did
not, however, signal that there would be no limitation to this type of testimony.
In the present case, the jury simply did not need to consider how a victim of
sexual abuse will be impacted in the long-term in order to determine whether or not the
alleged victims in the case at hand were molested by Mr. Aguilar. The State correctly
notes that defense counsel asked two of the alleged victims about their mental health
history and current medications. (Respondent's brief, p.8 (citing Trial Tr., p.375, LA -
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p.376, L.11; p.404, Ls.9-16).)

However, merely asking the children whether they

suffered from mental health issues, did not make the origins of their mental illnesses
relevant. Unlike in Dutt where the jury was given a description of the phenomenon of
delayed disclosure - an explanation to a lay adult for why a child victim may not
immediately report sexual abuse - promiscuity, substance abuse, body-image issues,
and mental illness occur in all manner of people, regardless of whether or not the
person suffering from these maladies have been sexually abused.

C.B. and J.A.'s

testimony that they were abused at the hands of Mr. Aguilar is not more credible merely
because they suffer from mental illness.
Furthermore, there was no temporal limitation placed on Ms. Yeager's testimony.
While the prosecutor argued to the district court that the testimony was relevant
because, "these boys are going to be talking about what happened to them years ago,
they are dealing with it now," the question itself posed no time limitation. (Tr. 2/23/10,
p.205, Ls.10-16.) The question actually asked solicited information about the "long-term
impact of the abuse" - not about what the alleged victims may be dealing with currently.

Id. Ms. Yeager answered the actual question asked to her and testified to all manner of
negative consequence - from chemical dependency, to promiscuity, to mental illness all of which are generally frowned upon by society at large. The State's argument is
without merit.
The State further asserts that even if the district court erred in admitting this
testimony, the error is harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) Mr. Aguilar asserts the
State's arguments are not compelling and the State has failed to meet the high burden
established in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
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II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Aguilar asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.

His arguments in support are contained in the Appellant's Brief

and need not be repeated herein.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Aguilar respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand
his case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that
this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence to no more than six years.
DATED this

4th

day of September, 2012.

JtX:SON
C. PI TLER
(f/
!eputy State Appellate Public Defender
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copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JAVIER AGUILAR
INMATE # 38205
ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE 1083707
BRADLY S FORD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
DENNIS CHARNEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, 10 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas

9

